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Regulating Prosecutors’ Courtroom Misconduct
Bruce A. Green*
Trial prosecutors’ visible misbehavior, such as improper questioning of
witnesses and improper jury arguments, may not seem momentous.
Sometimes, the improprieties are simply the product of poor training or
overenthusiasm. In many cases, they pass unremarked. As the Chicago Eight
trial illustrated, trial prosecutors’ improprieties may also be overshadowed
by the excesses of other trial participants—the witnesses, the defendants, the
defense lawyers, or even the trial judge. And when noticed, prosecutors’ trial
misbehavior can ordinarily be remedied, and then restrained, by a capable
trial judge. It is little wonder that disciplinary authorities, having bigger fish
to fry, are virtually indifferent to the problem. And yet, in the obvious
absence of disciplinary regulation, prosecutors and their offices have less
motivation to play by the rules.
The challenge for disciplinary regulation is to find a proportional
response to trial misconduct—one that does not punish prosecutors
undeservedly, unnecessarily, or too harshly but that nevertheless serves
regulatory ends. Building on the Supreme Court’s observation that a
prosecutor’s repeated improprieties should be met with “stern rebukes,” this
Article proposes that prosecutorial improprieties that are deserving of
judicial rebuke should not be forgotten. Rather, repositories—or rebuke
banks—should be maintained to preserve transcripts of prosecutors’ on-therecord misconduct, even when it is committed unintentionally. Maintaining
these records, which would be relatively easy in the computer age, would
serve salutary regulatory ends while maintaining the necessary sense of
proportionality.
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INTRODUCTION
Decades of writings have addressed prosecutors’ “[v]isible, forensic
misconduct,”1 such as their improper questioning of witnesses,
introduction of inadmissible evidence, and improper arguments to the
jury.2 It is unsurprising that so much attention has been drawn to
prosecutors’ efforts to put improper considerations before the jury and to
comparable courtroom excesses, since this misconduct is recorded in trial
transcripts and often challenged on appeal, generating published
appellate opinions.3 No doubt, the problem is perennial and unceasing4—
indeed, it appears to be the most commonly reported species of
prosecutorial misconduct.5 But it is not necessarily the most serious
1. Randolph N. Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor’s Misconduct, 23 CRIM. L. BULL. 550, 563
(1987).
2. See, e.g., H. Mitchell Caldwell, The Prosecutor Prince: Misconduct, Accountability, and a
Modest Proposal, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 51 (2013); Michael D. Cicchini, Combating Prosecutorial
Misconduct in Closing Arguments, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 887 (2018); Robert W. Clifford, Identifying
and Preventing Improper Prosecutorial Comment in Closing Argument, 51 ME. L. REV. 241
(1999); James W. Gunson, Prosecutorial Summation: Where Is the Line Between “Personal
Opinion” and Proper Argument?, 46 ME. L. REV. 241, 246 (1994); Frederick J. Ludwig, The Role
of the Prosecutor in a Fair Trial, 41 MINN. L. REV. 602, 613–15 (1957); Richard G. Singer,
Forensic Misconduct by Federal Prosecutors—and How It Grew, 20 ALA. L. REV. 227 (1968);
Henry Blaine Vess, Walking a Tightrope: A Survey of Limitations on the Prosecutor’s Closing
Argument, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22 (1973); J. Lyndal Hagemeyer, Note, Statements by
Prosecuting Attorneys to Juries Which Demand Improper Considerations for Verdict or
Punishment, 39 VA. L. REV. 85 (1953); Praatika Prasad, Note, Implicit Racial Biases in
Prosecutorial Summations: Proposing an Integrated Response, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 3091 (2018).
3. For a discussion of trial prosecutors’ improprieties, together with extensive citations to
appellate case law, see BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT chs. 10–11 (2d.
ed. 2018–2019), and JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT: LAW, PROCEDURE,
FORMS chs. 9–10 (4th ed. 2018).
4. See United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 661 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J.,
dissenting) (“This court has several times used vigorous language in denouncing government
counsel for such conduct as that of the United States Attorney here. But, each time, it has said that,
nevertheless, it would not reverse. Such an attitude of helpless piety is, I think, undesirable.”); Paul
J. Spiegelman, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument: The Role of Intent in Appellate
Review, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 115, 115–17 (1999) (noting “the abuse and disregard of
forensic propriety which threatens to become staple in American prosecutions” (quoting ROSCOE
POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 187 (1930))).
5. See KATHLEEN M. RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, N. CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT,
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problem of prosecutorial misconduct. Relatively few criminal cases go to
trial nowadays. When prosecutors engage in visible forensic misconduct,
it is often a result of prosecutors’ negligence, overexuberance, or
inadequate training,6 not a calculated decision to violate procedural
norms governing courtroom behavior.7 And it is assumed that this
misconduct is not ordinarily prejudicial, because capable trial judges can
ordinarily reduce or avert its impact by sustaining an objection and
issuing a curative instruction.8 One might be forgiven for thinking that
other aspects of prosecutorial misconduct are more serious and therefore
worthy of study and reform.9
Nevertheless, this Article argues that courts should take prosecutors’
PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 1997–2009
(2010); Harry Mitchell Caldwell, Everybody Talks About Prosecutorial Conduct but Nobody Does
Anything About It: A 25-Year Survey of Prosecutorial Misconduct and a Viable Solution, 2017 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1455.
6. See, e.g., Bell v. State, 723 So. 2d 896, 897 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (Altenbernd, J.,
concurring) (observing that “[t]here are about a dozen bad tactics that this court sees with regularity
in closing arguments” and suggesting that continuing legal education videotapes be made for
prosecutors and criminal defense lawyers demonstrating improper arguments), quoted in Craig Lee
Montz, Why Lawyers Continue to Cross the Line in Closing Argument: An Examination of Federal
and State Cases, 28 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 67, 131 (2001). The vagueness of the relevant standards,
in some cases, may also contribute to the prosecutor’s transgression. See Hagemeyer, supra note 2,
at 97.
7. See Bruce A. Green, The Ethical Prosecutor and the Adversary System, 24 CRIM. L. BULL.
126, 141 (1988) (noting that, particularly in rebuttal arguments, prosecutors may make improper
statements because of the lack of time for deliberation in selecting one’s wording). But see
Spiegelman, supra note 4 (discussing cases of intentional and recurring prosecutorial wrongdoing).
8. See Green, supra note 7, at 139–40 (noting “that most prosecutorial errors in summation,
viewed individually, are not serious enough to affect the outcome of a trial”).
9. Contemporary writings on prosecutors’ work do increasingly focus on prosecutors’ “serious
misconduct.” See, e.g., Thomas P. Sullivan & Maurice Possley, The Chronic Failure to Discipline
Prosecutors for Misconduct: Proposals for Reform, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 881 (2015).
These include writings on various conduct that is invisible and less easily detectable, such as
prosecutors’ failure to disclose evidence and information. In particular, contemporary writings on
prosecutors’ conduct have increasingly focused on prosecutors’ compliance with their disclosure
obligations. See, e.g., Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2015); R. Michael
Cassidy, Plea Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractable Problem of Impeachment Disclosures,
64 VAND. L. REV. 1429 (2011); Bruce A. Green, Federal Criminal Discovery Reform: A Legislative
Approach, 64 MERCER L. REV. 639 (2013); Susan R. Klein, Monitoring the Plea Process, 51 DUQ.
L. REV. 559 (2013); Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533
(2010); New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: Report of the Working
Groups on Best Practices, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961 (2010). These also include writings on
prosecutorial conduct that affects a broader array of cases, such as prosecutors’ abuse of discretion
in charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green & Samuel J. Levine,
Disciplinary Regulation of Prosecutors as a Remedy for Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion: A
Descriptive and Normative Analysis, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 143 (2016); Susan R. Klein et al.,
Waiving the Criminal Justice System: An Empirical and Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 73 (2015).
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courtroom misconduct more seriously. While many relevant writings
focus on how courts remedy prosecutorial misconduct,10 this Article joins
those emphasizing courts’ disciplinary role.11 It acknowledges that courts
should respond with varying levels of severity to lawyers’ trial
misconduct, including that of prosecutors, and that improper questions
and arguments are ordinarily minor infractions. As the Chicago Eight
trial, discussed in Part I, well illustrates, trial judges deserve criticism
when they overreact, as well as when they fail to react, to trial
participants’ perceived misconduct. Although trial and appellate courts
have a regulatory responsibility, described in Part II, to set standards of
proper trial conduct and to protect defendants from being prejudiced by
prosecutors’ misbehavior at trial, courts’ sense of proportionality
counsels against punishing prosecutors whose small transgressions are
isolated occurrences.
But overlooking prosecutorial misconduct is not necessarily the best
regulatory strategy. This Article argues in Part III that if judges do not
adequately police minor prosecutorial misconduct when it occurs in plain
view, prosecutors may not only continue minor transgressions but also
treat more serious rules more cavalierly. This Article urges courts to play
a more robust regulatory rule. The challenge is to identify a response that
strikes the right balance between proportionality and deterrence.
This Article proposes in Part IV that courts or disciplinary authorities
maintain “rebuke banks”—that is, repositories of trial transcripts
reflecting prosecutorial misbehavior that earned or deserved a rebuke.
These repositories will serve several regulatory functions, including (1)
increasing the efficacy of judicial rebukes, (2) facilitating more serious
discipline of prosecutors who repeatedly transgress, (3) facilitating
discipline of supervisory personnel and prosecutors’ offices when trial
prosecutors’ repeated transgressions are attributable to inadequate
training and oversight, and (4) facilitating prosecutorial training. Ideally,
more robust regulation of low-level prosecutorial misconduct will
strengthen internal professional controls that keep more serious
misconduct in check. And, incidentally, in their role as regulators,
prosecutors may develop greater empathy for individuals who engage in
low-level criminal wrongdoing.

10. See, e.g., Mary Nicol Bowman, Mitigating Foul Blows, 49 GA. L. REV. 309 (2015).
11. See, e.g., RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 5; David Keenan et al., The Myth of Prosecutorial
Accountability After Connick v. Thompson: Why Existing Professional Responsibility Measures
Cannot Protect Against Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 203 (2011).
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I. A STARTING POINT: THE CHICAGO EIGHT TRIAL
The Chicago Eight trial (which became the Chicago Seven trial) may
have been iconic,12 but it was scarcely exemplary except in a negative
sense.13 Over the course of the five-month trial, all of the participants,
including District Judge Hoffman, behaved badly. The trial has been held
up to exemplify bad courtroom management.14 For the most part, that is
because of the trial judge’s hostility and repressive measures toward the
defense.15 But a small part of the judge’s mismanagement, and one that
largely gets overlooked, was his failure to adequately regulate the
prosecution.
The Chicago Eight defendants, antiwar activists with several different
affiliations, were accused of conspiring to encourage rioting in
connection with antiwar protests held in August 1968 to coincide with
the Democratic Party’s national convention in Chicago.16 The trial was
closely watched and highly publicized. Observers on the left had good
reason to assume that the trial, commencing in September 1969, was
calculated by the Nixon administration to destroy the antiwar movement.
The constitutionality of the Anti-Riot Act under which the defendants
were charged was questionable,17 and the accusations seemed dubious,
given that some of the defendants had publicly promoted nonviolence and
that the police instigated most of the violence at the protests.
The defendants and defense lawyers were to varying degrees
disrespectful and disruptive. District Judge Hoffman overreacted,
demonstrating hostility toward the defense. At the outset, the judge
refused to delay the trial so that defendant Bobby Seale’s lawyer, who

12. Martha Neil, 40 Years Later, ‘Chicago 7’ Trial Still an Iconic Event, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 21,
2009, 10:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/40_years_later_chicago_7_trial_still
_an_iconic_event.
13. For accounts of the trial, see, for example, J. ANTHONY LUKAS, THE BARNYARD EPITHET
AND OTHER OBSCENITIES: NOTES ON THE CHICAGO CONSPIRACY TRIAL (1970).
14. See, e.g., Pnina Lahav, The Chicago Conspiracy Trial: Character and Judicial Discretion,
71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1327, 1337–38 (2000) (discussing how intrinsically unfair and inappropriate
it was for Judge Hoffman to bind and gag Bobby Seale in the course of the trial); Michael P. Scharf,
Chaos in the Courtroom: Controlling Disruptive Defendants and Contumacious Counsel in War
Crimes Trials, 39 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 155, 159 (2007) (noting that the Chicago Seven trial is
seen as a particularly low point in United States courtroom history).
15. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Regulating Discourtesy on the Bench: A Study
in the Evolution of Judicial Independence, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 535 (2009) (noting
that the reprehensibility of the Chicago Seven trial is mainly seen in the judge’s hostility and actions
toward the defense).
16. See United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 348–54 (7th Cir. 1972).
17. Id. at 409 (Pell, J., dissenting).
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needed emergency surgery, could participate.18 Six weeks into the trial,
having ordered Seale bound and gagged in response to his disruptions and
insults, Judge Hoffman granted him a mistrial.19 Although moments of
relative calm followed, and some defendants presented a conventional
defense, defendants Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin sought to turn the
trial into political theater, and particularly toward the end, the trial
erupted. In closing argument, the prosecutor unfairly alluded to the
defendants’ misbehavior and demeanor.20 In the end, two defendants
were acquitted on all counts; the other five were acquitted of the alleged
conspiracy but convicted on substantive counts in what seemed to be a
compromise verdict.21 Additionally, Judge Hoffman tried all eight
defendants and two of the defense lawyers for criminal contempt, based
on their insulting and disruptive trial conduct, and found all ten guilty. 22
The court of appeals overturned the five defendants’ convictions on
the substantive counts largely because of the trial judge’s inappropriate
reaction to perceived misconduct from the defense.23 The appeals court
was especially troubled by Judge Hoffman’s “deprecatory and often
antagonistic attitude toward the defense” as reflected in statements during
the trial “implying . . . that defense counsel was inept, bumptious, or
untrustworthy, or that his case lacked merit.”24 Many of Judge Hoffman’s
comments to the defense lawyers were gratuitous and sarcastic and
occurred in the presence of the jury. Taken together, they “telegraphed to
the jury the judge’s contempt for the defense.” 25 Additionally, the
appellate court found, the prosecutor made arguments at or beyond “the
outermost boundary of permissible inferences” and improperly referred
to the defendants’ “[d]ress, personal appearance, and conduct at trial
[none of which were] probative of guilt.”26 The appellate court also set
aside all ten contempt convictions and remanded the cases for trial by a
new judge, finding that Judge Hoffman should never have conducted the
contempt trials himself, because, as the target of the alleged contemnors’
attacks, he could not be impartial.27 On remand, a different judge tried
the contempt cases, sustained only a handful of the charges, and imposed
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 349–50 (7th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 350.
In re Dellinger, 472 F.2d at 390.
Id. at 348.
Seale, 461 F.2d 345; In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972).
In re Dellinger, 472 F.2d at 385–91.
Id. at 386–87.
Id. at 387.
Id. at 390.
Seale, 461 F.2d 345; In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3409231

GREEN-REGULATING PROSECUTORS COURTROOM MISCONDUCT (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

Regulating Prosecutors’ Courtroom Misconduct

6/24/2019 10:42 AM

107

no punishment.28
It is easy for the prosecutor’s misconduct to be overlooked in this story.
His improper jury arguments were isolated, momentary, possibly
spontaneous, and certainly trivial compared to the extreme misbehavior
of other participants, including the judge. In contrast to the defense
lawyers who were tried for contempt of court, the prosecutor suffered
only whatever embarrassment followed from a critical appellate opinion.
One might wonder, however, whether the appellate court’s measured
response to the prosecutor’s improper closing arguments adequately
served the public interest in regulating prosecutors: Granted that much of
what is sometimes termed “prosecutorial misconduct” is really just a
minor departure from procedural norms, do prosecutorial infractions
merit more than, at worst, a judicial rebuke?
II. COURTS’ CONVENTIONAL ROLE IN REGULATING PROSECUTORS’ TRIAL
INFRACTIONS
A. Trial Courts’ Role
The Supreme Court’s 1935 opinion in Berger v. United States29
defines trial courts’ conventional role in regulating lawyers’ trial
misconduct. During cross examination and summation in Berger, the
prosecutor bullied witnesses and mischaracterized their testimony,
implied that he possessed extrajudicial knowledge and assumed facts not
in evidence, and generally “conduct[ed] himself in a thoroughly
indecorous and improper manner.”30 The Court’s opinion overturning the
conviction is best remembered for its observations about the prosecutor’s
role,31 but the opinion also spoke to the role of the trial judge in regulating
prosecutors who misbehave. Although the district judge in Berger
sustained some of the defense lawyer’s objections and instructed the jury
to disregard some of the prosecutor’s improper questions and comments,
this response, said the Court, was too mild. At the very least, the district
28. In re Dellinger, 370 F. Supp. 1304 (N.D. Ill. 1973), aff’d, 502 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1974).
29. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
30. Id. at 84.
31. The Court reminded prosecutors that they are “the servant of the law” whose interest in
seeing “that justice shall be done” gives them a responsibility to “govern impartially,” to avoid
“strik[ing] foul [blows],” and to “refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction.” Id. at 88. See also id. (“The United States Attorney is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution
is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”). On the importance of the Court’s
statement, see Bennett L. Gershman, “Hard Strikes and Foul Blows:” Berger v. United States 75
Years After, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 177, 201–05 (2010).
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judge should have met the prosecutor’s misconduct with “stern rebuke
and repressive measures.”32 And if that did not work, a mistrial might
have been necessary.33
The role of the trial judge envisioned by Berger differs from the
passive, detached or “umpireal” role often associated with appellate
judges.34 Of necessity, trial judges are expected to take an active, engaged
role in trials, especially criminal trials, to ensure fair process.35 Among
other things, this means interceding to remedy and prevent prosecutorial
misconduct. Of course, trial judges must restrain misconduct not just by
prosecutors but by all trial lawyers, all of whom are governed by judicial
decisions and professional conduct rules regulating witness examinations
and jury arguments.36 Prosecutors are scarcely the only ones who
sometimes engage in on-the-record courtroom improprieties such as
those on display in Berger. Other trial lawyers also cross the line,37 as the
Chicago Eight trial illustrated. Indeed, one can safely assume that
criminal defense lawyers are far more likely to get away with
improprieties, if only because acquittals procured through courtroom
misconduct are exempt from appellate review.38 But trial judges have
32. Berger, 295 U.S. at 85. The Court observed:
We reproduce in the margin a few excerpts from the record illustrating some of the
various points of the foregoing summary. It is impossible, however, without reading the
testimony at some length, and thereby obtaining a knowledge of the setting in which the
objectionable matter occurred, to appreciate fully the extent of the misconduct. The trial
judge, it is true, sustained objections to some of the questions, insinuations and
misstatements, and instructed the jury to disregard them. But the situation was one which
called for stern rebuke and repressive measures and, perhaps, if these were not
successful, for the granting of a mistrial. It is impossible to say that the evil influence
upon the jury of these acts of misconduct was removed by such mild judicial action as
was taken.
Id. at 84–85.
33. Id. at 85.
34. See Bruce Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Judicial Activism in Trial Courts, 74 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. (forthcoming 2019).
35. See Berger, 295 U.S. at 84–85; see also Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 248 (1943).
36. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (A lawyer shall
not . . . in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that
will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except
when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility
of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused . . . .).
37. See, e.g., GLEASON L. ARCHER, ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE LAWYER 177–79 (1910)
(addressing trial lawyers’ duties not to offer improper evidence and not to argue upon matters not
in evidence); 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY, ADDRESSED TO STUDENTS AND
THE PROFESSION GENERALLY 772–73 (Resolution XLVII) (Baltimore, Joseph Neal, 2d ed. 1836)
(resolving to rely only on “logical and just reasoning” and “such appeals to the sympathies of our
common nature, as are worthy, legitimate, well timed, and in good taste”).
38. See State v. Salitros, 499 N.W.2d 815, 817 (Minn. 1993) (“Because only convicted
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reason to be particularly vigilant in overseeing prosecutors, given their
constitutional commitment to providing fair trials to those accused of
crime.
Trial judges have a responsibility to respond to prosecutors’
misconduct in two ways in order to protect the fairness of the trial. First,
trial judges must remedy lawyers’ misconduct, typically by sustaining
objections and instructing jurors to disregard improper questions and
arguments. There is a considerable body of judicial opinions about trial
judges’ curative instructions and whether they were sufficient to cure the
prejudice caused by a prosecutor’s attempt to influence jurors
improperly.39 In general, courts presume that jurors follow curative
instructions. In extreme cases of prosecutorial misconduct, as Berger
suggests, the remedy may be a mistrial.40 But this is a rare response to
prosecutorial misconduct.41
Additionally, as Berger also suggests, trial judges may aim to deter or
prevent lawyers’ further misconduct in the proceeding. In general,
lawyers do not want to be on the wrong side of the judge and therefore,
it will often be effective for a judge simply to tell the lawyer when
particular conduct is out of bounds and should be discontinued. If more
is needed, trial judges can communicate their displeasure either explicitly
or in a manner that may not be fully reflected on the record, such as by
an irate tone of voice or an angry stare. Berger advises that on top of a
“stern rebuke,” the trial judge can adopt “repressive measures.” 42 These
might include issuing an order forbidding particular conduct and may
even include a threat to hold the lawyer in contempt of court if the lawyer
violates the order. However, contempt of court is an extreme response,

defendants can appeal, this court in opinions tends to focus on prosecutorial misconduct. However,
this court is aware from reading transcripts of trials that the problem [of improper closing
arguments] is not limited to the prosecution.”). Accounts of nineteenth and early twentieth century
criminal trials suggest that, in fact, testing and exceeding the limits of proper trial conduct was part
of criminal defense lawyers’ art. See generally ALFRED COHN & JOE CHISHOLM, “TAKE THE
WITNESS!” (1934); RICHARD H. ROVERE, HOWE & HUMMEL: THEIR TRUE AND SCANDALOUS
HISTORY (1947); RICHARD H. UNDERWOOD, GASLIGHT LAWYERS (2017).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 171 F.3d 695, 701–02 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding that the
prosecutor’s misstatement of testimony was not sufficiently mitigated by standard instruction that
closing arguments are not evidence); id. at 706 & n.4 (Garland, J., dissenting) (citing authority)
(maintaining that under Supreme Court case law, the instructions sufficiently mitigated prejudice).
40. 295 U.S. at 84–85.
41. For an example of where the Court granted a mistrial because of the prosecutor’s improper
question on cross-examination, see Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982). For an unusual case
where the prosecutor engaged in deliberate misconduct in closing argument in order to provoke a
mistrial, see State v. Yetman, 516 S.W.3d 33 (Tex. App. 2016).
42. 295 U.S. at 84–85.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3409231

GREEN-REGULATING PROSECUTORS COURTROOM MISCONDUCT (DO NOT DELETE)

110

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

6/24/2019 10:42 AM

[Vol. 50

rarely if ever invoked in cases of prosecutors’ forensic misconduct.43
As Berger illustrates, trial judges often under-regulate prosecutors’
courtroom misconduct. In some cases, this is simply because trial judges
do not recognize that prosecutors’ conduct is improper. The judge may
be inattentive or inexpert regarding the applicable rules and law, or may
credit prosecutors with knowing the bounds of propriety and staying
within them. In other cases, trial judges fail to adequately police
prosecutors because they do not acknowledge the extent of the
prosecutor’s impropriety or assume it to be inadvertent and aberrational.
Judges may have an institutional interest in minimizing the likely impact
of prosecutors’ misbehavior to avoid the need for a retrial or, if a
conviction occurs, a reversal of the conviction. In general, if trial judges
pronounce prosecutorial misconduct to be insignificant, appellate courts
will defer to that determination. And even when judges recognize that
prosecutors engaged in misconduct that may be prejudicial, judges may
be reluctant to rebuke prosecutors, whether because of sympathy for
prosecutors (or lawyers generally) or, particularly where trial judges are
not life tenured, out of fear of prosecutorial retaliation.44
While some trial judges may adequately police their courtrooms by
remedying prosecutorial misconduct and deterring further misconduct,
this overlooks trial judges’ disciplinary role. When prosecutors exceed
the bounds of propriety in their questioning and arguing, trial judges
conventionally focus on preserving a fair trial. It would be unusual for
trial judges to refer prosecutors to the disciplinary authorities or to initiate
either sanctions or contempt proceedings when prosecutors misbehave at
trial. Trial judges have no obligation to report lawyers’ minor
transgressions to the disciplinary authority, 45 and it appears that trial
judges are generally remiss in even reporting prosecutors’ serious
transgressions, which they are obligated to do.46 In part, this is because
judges perceive their workload to be heavy,47 and resolving cases seems
43. See Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEX.
L. REV. 629, 673–76 (1972). Professor Alschuler identified only one case where a prosecutor was
held in contempt for an improper courtroom statement, but the sanction was reversed on appeal. Id.
at 674 & n.167 (citing Brutkiewicz v. State, 191 So. 2d 222 (1966)).
44. For example, in states such as Missouri where lawyers can recuse the judge assigned to a
case, prosecutors acting in concert may recuse a judge whom they believe to be excessively harsh,
thereby precluding that judge from presiding over criminal cases.
45. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.15(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014) (“A judge
having knowledge that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
that raises a substantial question regarding the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a
lawyer in other respects shall inform the appropriate authority.” (emphasis added)).
46. See RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 5.
47. See generally Bruce A. Green, The Price of Judicial Economy in the US, 7 OÑATI SOCIO-
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like a more important use of limited time than regulating lawyers. One
may suspect that many judges have particular sympathy for prosecutors
or may not want to antagonize the prosecutor’s office by initiating a
disciplinary inquiry against a prosecutor.
Even if conscientious trial judges seek to serve regulatory objectives,
they may reasonably perceive that the objectives of the disciplinary
system are adequately served through informal measures rather than by
initiating a formal disciplinary inquiry. Trial judges may have confidence
that their stern rebukes and other responses to misconduct in the course
of a trial will educate prosecutors about proper conduct, encourage them
to engage in further self-education, and motivate them to “play within the
lines” in future proceedings. If their confidence were well placed, trial
judges might have no reason to do more, since professional discipline
would seem to be unnecessarily harsh relative to the prosecutor’s minor
transgression.
B. Appellate Courts’ Role
Berger also reflects appellate courts’ conventional regulatory role,
which is twofold—to overturn convictions that may be attributable to the
prosecutor’s misconduct and to set standards of trial conduct for
prosecutors in future cases. But appellate judges, like trial judges, do not
conventionally serve a meaningful disciplinary function for two reasons.
First, appellate courts, in the context of reviewing convicted
defendants’ appeals, provide a remedy when a prosecutor’s misconduct
may have contributed to the defendant’s conviction. Appellate court
decisions going back to the nineteenth century have overturned
convictions where prosecutors brought improper considerations before
the jury, such as by offering inadmissible evidence, asking questions
without a good faith basis, referring to facts outside the record, or
appealing to jurors’ sympathy or prejudice.48
LEGAL
SERIES
790,
793–808
(2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3035295.
48. See, e.g., Holder v. State, 25 S.W. 279 (Ark. 1894) (overturning conviction based
prosecutor’s improper questions and remarks, where the trial judge’s rebuke was too mild to cure
prejudice); People v. Wells, 34 P. 1078 (Cal. 1893) (reversing a conviction where a prosecutor
repeatedly and knowingly asked objectionable questions to imply inadmissible or false
information); People v. Lee Chuck, 20 P. 719 (Cal. 1889) (reversing a conviction where a
prosecutor attempted to admit evidence by arguing its effect and using improper testimony); State
v. Williams, 18 N.W. 682 (Iowa 1884) (reversing conviction where a prosecutor’s opening
statement included detailed recitation of facts, many of which he failed to prove); People v. Dane,
26 N.W. 781 (Mich. 1886) (reversing conviction where a prosecutor asserted personal knowledge
of defendant’s guilt); Hardaway v. State, 54 So. 833 (Miss. 1911) (reversing conviction where a
prosecutor appealed to racial prejudice). See also ALEXANDER H. ROBBINS, A TREATISE ON
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But reversals for prosecutors’ forensic misconduct are infrequent for
several reasons. First, trial judges have broad discretion to decide whether
and how to respond to courtroom transgressions, starting with the
question of whether the lawyer’s courtroom conduct is improper.49
Judges are given considerable leeway, in part, because the relevant facts
are likely to vary, and the trial judge is best placed to ascertain them;
because trial judges have many alternative ways to respond to
misconduct; and because trial judges must make quick decisions with
little opportunity for analysis and reflection. Moreover, appellate courts
do not expect perfection.
Additionally, appellate courts rarely overturn criminal convictions
merely as a sanction for prosecutors’ courtroom misbehavior. 50 Most
courts will not overturn a conviction if the prosecutor’s misconduct was
“harmless.”51 If not convinced that the prosecutor’s misconduct may
have contributed to the jury’s guilty verdict, the reviewing court will
ordinarily let the conviction stand.52 That means, if the prosecutor’s
transgression was by nature unlikely to influence the jury, was adequately
remedied by the trial judge,53 or was unlikely to have mattered given the
overwhelming evidence of guilt, the appellate court may acknowledge
that the prosecutor misbehaved but conclude that it probably did not
matter. In many jurisdictions, the hurdle is even higher if the defense
AMERICAN ADVOCACY 125–31, 140–41 (2d ed. 1913) (addressing excesses and improprieties in
prosecutors’ opening and closing statements).
49. See United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619, 628 (10th Cir. 1990) (discussing how trial courts
must make immediate decisions when confronted by the offending conduct of an attorney in open
court).
50. See United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1183 (2d Cir. 1981) (“As a practical matter,
prosecutors know that courts are reluctant to overturn convictions because of improper remarks,
when the defendant’s guilt is clear.”).
51. See generally Michael T. Fisher, Note, Harmless Error, Prosecutorial Misconduct, and Due
Process: There’s More to Due Process than the Bottom Line, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1298, 1301–02
(1988).
52. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 56 N.E. 1001, 1004 (N.Y. 1900); see generally Bruce Green &
Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51, 63 (2016);
Lauren Morehouse, Note, Demanding the Last Word: Why Defendants Deserve the Final Closing
Argument During the Sentencing Phase of Capital Cases, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 841, 864–65
(2018). But see State v. Salitros, 499 N.W.2d 815, 820 (Minn. 1993) (overturning criminal
conviction for prosecutorial misconduct “in the exercise of [the court’s] supervisory power over
the trial courts and in the interests of justice”).
53. See, e.g., State v. Hilton, 431 A.2d 1296, 1302 (Me. 1981) (“Only where there are
exceptionally prejudicial circumstances or prosecutorial bad faith will a curative instruction be
deemed inadequate to eliminate the prejudice.”); see generally Tara J. Tobin, Note, Miscarriage of
Justice During Closing Arguments by an Overzealous Prosecutor and a Timid Supreme Court in
State v. Smith, 45 S.D. L. REV. 186, 220–22 (2000) (discussing the “cured error doctrine” under
which a prosecutor’s misconduct is deemed “cured” if the trial judge took adequate remedial
measures by correcting the prosecutor’s improper statement or instructing the jury to ignore it).
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never objected to the prosecutor’s misbehavior at trial.54
Second, in issuing opinions regarding prosecutors’ trial conduct,
appellate courts often establish or reaffirm standards of trial conduct,
whether or not they overturn the conviction. This is an important
regulatory role, because the relevant professional conduct rules, which
are written at a high level of generality, do not themselves give lawyers,
including prosecutors, necessary guidance. Whenever appellate courts
review challenges to how prosecutors questioned witnesses or argued to
the jury, the courts have the chance to say whether the prosecutor’s
conduct was permissible and explain why. This has an important
pedagogic function. Courts expect prosecutors to become familiar with
the teachings of their opinions (if not the opinions themselves), because
prosecutors’ offices train their prosecutors on the law and because
prosecutors (like all lawyers) have a professional responsibility to keep
up with the law bearing on their work.55 Particularly for prosecutors who
prefer to learn by the case method, published opinions provide a chance
to learn from prior real-life experience.56
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion in Calhoun v. United States,57 where the
prosecutor made “racially charged” comments while cross examining the
defendant and on summation,58 is an example of an opinion meant almost
exclusively to serve a pedagogic function. The principal contested issue
at trial was whether the defendant, who was in a hotel room when an
acquaintance sold drugs to an undercover drug agent, knew of the deal in
advance and had come to help.59 The defendant testified that he was
unaware of the drug deal.60 The prosecutor responded that the defendant
must have known that drugs were to be sold because, “You’ve got
African-Americans, you’ve got Hispanics, you’ve got a bag full of
money.”61 It was wrong for the prosecutor to suggest that race should
play a role in determining whether the defendant had criminal intent, said
Justice Sotomayor, but the conviction had to stand because the
54. See generally James A. Morrow & Joshua R. Larson, Without a Doubt, a Sharp and Radical
Departure: The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision to Change Plain Error Review of
Unobjected-to Prosecutorial Error in State v. Ramey, 31 HAMLINE L. REV. 351 (2008).
55. On prosecutors’ obligation to engage in ongoing learning, see Connick v. Thompson, 563
U.S. 51, 65 (2011).
56. Cf. Bruce A. Green, There but for Fortune: Real-Life vs. Fictional “Case Studies” in Legal
Ethics, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 977, 977–78 (2000) (advocating the use of real-life case studies in
teaching legal ethics).
57. 568 U.S. 1206 (2013) (Sotomayor, J.) (respecting the denial of certiorari).
58. Id. at 1206.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1206–07.
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defendant’s trial lawyer failed to object at the time.62 Therefore, the Court
did not accept the case for review. Justice Sotomayor nonetheless wrote
an opinion to express her “hope never to see a case like this again.”63
But at the same time, appellate courts express frustration when
prosecutors do not adhere to their teachings. An 1889 opinion of the
California Supreme Court, bemoaning that “[w]e have been called upon
many times to caution, sometimes to rebuke, prosecuting officers for the
overzealous performance of their duties,”64 suggested that judges were
reaching the limits of their patience 130 years ago. More than a century
later, appellate courts still express frustration about prosecutors’
recurring courtroom misbehavior.65
Notwithstanding their frustration, appellate courts are traditionally
reluctant to serve an explicit disciplinary function. On top of
considerations that generally discourage judges from serving a
disciplinary role in cases of prosecutorial misconduct, some appellate
judges may assume that disciplining prosecutors is better left to trial
judges who are present when misconduct occurs and witnessed the
conduct in question, rather than to appellate judges reading trial
transcripts. On occasion, frustrated appellate courts have threatened
prosecutors with personal sanctions, whether formal or informal, when
prosecutors have ignored the teachings of prior opinions.66 Courts have
threatened to rebuke errant prosecutors by name in published opinions as
a form of informal professional discipline,67 and have even threatened

62. Id. at 1207–08.
63. Id. at 1209.
64. People v. Lee Chuck, 20 P. 719, 723 (Cal. 1889).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1182 (2d Cir. 1981) (“We . . . find
ourselves in a situation with which this Court is all too familiar: a prosecutor has delivered an
improper summation, despite this Court’s oft-expressed concern over the frequency with which
improper prosecution summations occur.”).
66. See, e.g., id. at 1186 (“[W]e hope to have made it clear that improper summations in the
future, especially if done on repeated occasions by the same prosecutor, run the distinct risk of
direct sanctions against the attorney.”); Bell v. State, 723 So. 2d 896, 897 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(Altenbernd, J., concurring) (urging creation of a videotape on proper jury argument to be shown
to lawyers who violate the rules, and that “[a]fter two or three viewings, if an attorney still cannot
argue within the rules, other more serious sanctions should be imposed either by a supervising
attorney or by the trial court”).
67. Cf. Modica, 663 F.2d at 1185 (noting appellate courts’ ability to name prosecutors in
published opinions as a form of reprimand, but adding that most courts are reluctant to do so and
refraining from naming the prosecutor in this specific case). On judicial shaming as a strategy for
influencing prosecutors’ conduct, see Lara Bazelon, For Shame: The Public Humiliation of
Prosecutors by Judges to Correct Wrongful Convictions, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 305 (2016);
Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys to Reduce Prosecutorial
Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059 (2009).
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disbarment.68 But courts rarely if ever make good on their threats.69
Appellate courts express hope that their threats will lead prosecutors to
follow the rules while acknowledging that past threats have been
ineffective, leaving appellate courts at a loss for how to serve a
constructive disciplinary role.
III. THE NEED TO ENHANCE DISCIPLINARY REGULATION OF
PROSECUTORS’ IN-COURT MISCONDUCT
As described in Part II, courts’ conventional responses to prosecutors’
visible forensic misconduct serve various salutary objectives. Appellate
courts issue opinions establishing and elaborating on the standards
governing prosecutors’ behavior at trial in order to educate prosecutors
about what the law expects. Both trial judges and appellate judges take
steps to remedy misconduct when it occurs—trial judges by sustaining
objections and issuing curative instructions, and appellate judges by
overturning convictions that were tainted by prosecutorial misconduct.
Trial judges can also deter prosecutors’ further misbehavior in the
particular trials over which the judges preside by issuing stern rebukes or
through harsher measures. However, judges ordinarily overlook the
disciplinary function, which aims to deter misconduct in future
proceedings both by the particular lawyer who misbehaves and by other
lawyers.70 Judges rarely refer prosecutors to disciplinary authorities for
low-level forensic misconduct or impose sanctions on their own.
In theory, professional discipline is a possibility when prosecutors
misbehave in court.71 Disciplinary authorities can read court opinions and
transcripts and initiate proceedings on their own. In practice, however,
68. See, e.g., Bell, 723 So. 2d at 897 (“If trial attorneys recognize improper argument and persist
in its use, they should not be members of The Florida Bar.”).
69. See Spiegelman, supra note 4, at 169–70 (“Other than censuring through reversals, the
commonsense remedy for recidivist prosecutors is to reveal them by naming them, by reprimanding
them in published opinions, and even by referring them to local bars for discipline. However, one
of the striking realities of the forty-five recent federal reversals is that despite findings of intentional
misconduct and extensive criticism of prosecutors’ conduct, not one court ordered a prosecutor
disciplined or referred a prosecutor for discipline.”).
70. See, e.g., Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Havercamp, 442 N.W.2d 67, 69 (Iowa 1989)
(noting that the determination of “whether and to what extent discipline should be imposed. . . . is
guided by certain well-recognized standards: the nature of the alleged violations, the need for
deterrence, protection of the public, maintenance of the reputation of the law as a whole, and the
respondent’s fitness to continue in the practice of law”).
71. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Farrell, Note, Advocacy, Justice, and Prosecutorial Misconduct: The
Death of the Prosecutor’s Reasonable Inference on Credibility Issues, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 299,
321–23 (2002) (asserting that the courts should not reverse convictions as a deterrent for
prosecutorial misconduct that was harmless, because prosecutors are subject to professional
discipline).
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disciplinary authorities show little interest in regulating low-level
prosecutorial misconduct, including prosecutors’ forensic misconduct.
This is not simply because disciplinary authorities are traditionally
reluctant to proceed against prosecutors for any misconduct.72 It is largely
because, even though prosecutors’ forensic misconduct occurs on the
record and is therefore easy to prove, disciplinary authorities regard this
misconduct to be too insignificant to deserve formal disciplinary
sanctions.
Like prosecutors themselves, disciplinary authorities exercise
discretion in deciding when to bring charges.73 In doing so, authorities
ordinarily take account of the seriousness of the wrongdoing and the
extent of the wrongdoer’s culpability. There are few cases of public
discipline imposed against civil litigators for low-level misconduct such
as discovery abuse or frivolous filings, notwithstanding the perception
that this misconduct is rife. Disciplinary authorities reserve their efforts
for more serious wrongdoing. Because prosecutors’ forensic misconduct
is often unpremeditated and its impact is often insignificant, disciplinary
authorities tend to disregard it.74 In other words, disciplinary authorities
act out of the same sense of proportionality as trial judges. Therefore, if
the trial judge did not refer the prosecutor’s conduct to the disciplinary
authority, the disciplinary authority might understandably defer to the
trial judge’s presumed judgment that a disciplinary sanction would be
excessive.
Although proportionality is an important principle, it is questionable
whether minor, but visible, prosecutorial infractions should be ignored
entirely in the disciplinary process. Contemporary social science
teachings offer reasons to worry that this strategy fosters not only
recurring low-level misconduct but more serious wrongdoing.75
There is no one reason why people violate rules in general, and no one
reason why prosecutors do so in particular. But studies identify factors

72. This may be changing. See Green & Levine, supra note 9, at 144–45 (discussing how recent
high-profile disciplinary cases have spurred a more serious response by disciplinary agencies to
prosecutorial misconduct); Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 52, at 78–83 (discussing various ABA
rules, state bar ethics committee resolutions, and state court holdings that have increased
regulations on prosecutorial misconduct).
73. See generally Bruce A. Green, Lawyer Discipline: Conscientious Noncompliance,
Conscious Avoidance, and Prosecutorial Discretion, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1307 (1998).
74. For notable exceptions, see In re Zawada, 92 P.3d 862, 866–67, 871 (Ariz. 2004)
(suspending a prosecutor for improper trial tactics), and In re Weber, 2012 Ill. Atty. Reg. Disc.
LEXIS 75, 139, 141–43 (May 3, 2012) (recommending that the prosecutor be censured for
improprieties in jury arguments).
75. See infra notes 77–84 and accompanying text.
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that may have the effect of discouraging or encouraging wrongdoing.
Ordinary intuition suggests that, if disciplinary authorities do not sanction
lawyers for improper questioning and arguments, then prosecutors will
lose respect for the underlying rules and judicial rulings and violate them
more frequently than if the rules were enforced through sanctions.76
Social science scholarship accords with that intuition.
One reason why judicial indifference is problematic is that, insofar as
prosecutors engage in an implicit balancing of risks and rewards,
courtroom misconduct comes with no personal risk. The costs of
misbehavior are all externalized. If wrongdoing contributes to a
conviction, the defendant suffers. In the unlikely event that a trial court
grants a mistrial or an appellate court overturns a conviction, the
prosecutor’s office bears a cost. While the office may impose some
internal sanction on the prosecutor in such a case, it is just as likely that,
for any of several reasons, the office will support the trial prosecutor.
Punishing the prosecutor may undermine group solidarity and lead
prosecutors to act in an overly cautious manner. Therefore, if the question
is a close one, the office may defend the prosecutor’s behavior, and even
if the trial prosecutor’s behavior was clearly wrongful, the office may
excuse it on the theory that a suitably aggressive prosecutor cannot help
but get carried away occasionally.
One might hope that, for the individual prosecutor who misbehaves, a
judge’s rebuke on the trial record will have a lasting impact, thereby
serving as a deterrent beyond the trial in which the rebuke is issued. But
the greater likelihood is that a judge’s rebuke will have, at most, a
momentary sting. Various cognitive factors may undermine the longevity
of its impact. Where prosecutors have no lasting reminder of the rebuke,
they may experience “unethical amnesia”: The memory of their
professional misbehavior and whatever embarrassment resulted may fade
over time.77
The literature also suggests the possibility that institutional tolerance
76. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, The Purposes of Lawyer Discipline, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV.
675, 739 (2003) (“[W]hen rule violations that are visible or well-known go unsanctioned, such
failure to prosecute undermines the professional standard as a credible threat. It encourages other
lawyers to violate the particular standard or the codes as a whole.” (footnotes omitted)).
77. See generally Maryam Kouchaki & Francesca Gino, Memories of Unethical Actions
Become
Obfuscated
Over
Time,
113
PNAS
6166
(2016),
http://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/113/22/6166.full.pdf; see also Lisa L. Shu & Francesca Gino,
Sweeping Dishonesty Under the Rug: How Unethical Actions Lead to Forgetting of Moral Rules,
102 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1164, 1164 (2012) (describing a study showing “moral
forgetting”—that is, that those engaging in unethical behavior are more likely to forget the moral
rules).
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of small acts of misconduct can lead to bigger ones. This is the problem
of “ethical slippage,”78 also known as “incrementalism” or the “slippery
slope.”79 If prosecutors, while vigorously trying cases, can get away with
overreaching in little visible ways, they may grow less hesitant to commit
more serious, but less visible, misconduct.
Even if one disputes that judges tolerate prosecutorial misconduct, the
absence of a disciplinary consequence effaces the ethical dimension of
prosecutors’ in-court behavior. Improprieties in examining witnesses,
evidentiary offers, and arguments may be perceived to be an evidentiary
problem, not an ethical problem. The consequence is that prosecutors
may lose, or never gain, a “moral awareness”80—an awareness of the
ethical implications of their courtroom conduct—and may simply
perceive the question presented by their questionable conduct as one of
admissibility. Well-intentioned prosecutors are more likely to take
evidentiary risks than ethical risks, and are more likely to skirt the bounds
of inadmissibility than of moral propriety.
One might worry about the impact of disciplinary indifference not only
on the individual prosecutor but on the culture of the prosecutor’s office.
In addressing ethical questions, lawyers are influenced by their peers.81
Consequently, the cultures of the institutions in which people work
significantly influence the extent of their compliance with rules.82 This is

78. Cf. Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper’s
Guide to the Psychology, Culture, and Ethics of Financial Risk Taking, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1209,
1214 (2011) (“[E]thical slippage is often the precursor to what later becomes a violation of law:
moral rationalization leads to small levels of opportunism about which no guilt is felt, leading to
sequentially bigger levels of cheating before the reality of legal wrongdoing becomes clear.”).
79. See Tigran W. Eldred, Insights from Psychology: Teaching Behavioral Legal Ethics as a
Core Element of Professional Responsibility, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 757, 780 n.93, 791–93
(observing that “[r]esearch demonstrates that it is easier for people to engage in unethical behavior
incrementally—that is, by gradually increasing the severity of infractions over time—rather than
abruptly and all at once” (citing authority)); Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean R. Sternlight,
Behavioral Legal Ethics, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107, 1120–24 (2013) (discussing how ethical slippery
slopes “contribute to a process of ethical fading or moral disengagement”).
80. See generally Robert A. Prentice, Behavioral Ethics: Can It Help Lawyers (and Others) Be
Their Best Selves?, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 35, 47–49 (2015) (discussing moral
awareness in the context of lawyers’ ethics).
81. See Bruce Green & Jane Campbell Moriarty, Rehabilitating Lawyers: Perceptions of
Deviance and its Cures in the Lawyer Reinstatement Process, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 139, 160
n.79 (2012) (citing authority).
82. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933
(2017).
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true for the culture of lawyers’ offices,83 including those of prosecutors.84
If judges do not adequately police minor prosecutorial misconduct
occurring in plain view, they may permit an institutional culture to
develop or persist where prosecutors treat more serious rules equally
cavalierly.
None of this is to suggest that prosecutors should be disbarred for
forensic misconduct. It is simply to suggest that courts should look for a
response to prosecutors’ low-level courtroom misbehavior that, although
not excessive, adequately serves the regulatory objectives of professional
discipline—and, in particular, deterrence.
IV. A PROPOSAL: “REBUKE BANKS”
When prosecutors engage in visible forensic misconduct, courts
seeking to serve a disciplinary role face the challenge of discouraging
future prosecutorial misconduct without punishing prosecutors too
harshly. The sanctions afforded by the formal disciplinary process—
disbarment, suspension, public reprimand, or private censure—may seem
too harsh, especially for what may appear to the judge before whom the
misconduct occurs to be an isolated, unpremeditated, and harmless
infraction. Prosecutors, like all lawyers, are imperfect. An occasional
improper question, attempt to offer inadmissible evidence, or improper
argument, will typically appear to be an innocent mistake, undeserving
of a sanction that will stain the prosecutor’s entire career. Erring on the
side of leniency, courts typically settle at most for on-the-record rebukes,
which provide little, if any, deterrence.85
This Article proposes an initiative that may strike a better balance
between the competing interests in proportionality and deterrence: that
courts establish repositories of trial transcripts reflecting prosecutors’
misbehavior. When the trial judge rebukes a prosecutor, or concludes in
retrospect that the prosecutor deserved rebuke, the relevant portion of the
trial transcript should be added to a searchable database. The purpose
would be to enable courts and disciplinary authorities to track cases in
which a particular prosecutor misbehaves as well as cases in which
prosecutors from a particular office or unit of an office engage in similar
83. See Catherine Gage O’Grady, Behavioral Legal Ethics, Decision Making, and the New
Attorney’s Unique Professional Perspective, 15 NEV. L.J. 671, 681 (2015); Milton C. Regan, Jr.,
Nested Ethics: A Tale of Two Cultures, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 143, 155–60 (2013).
84. See, e.g., Ellen Yaroshefsky & Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors’ Ethics in Context, in
LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 269 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn
Mather eds., 2012).
85. Some have regarded courtroom rebukes as a form of sanction, albeit the most ineffectual.
See Singer, supra note 2, at 273–74.
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misbehavior.
These repositories—or “rebuke banks”—would be intended to serve
several functions.
First, they would serve a pedagogic function by compiling concrete
examples of prosecutorial misbehavior. Although some instances of
courtroom misconduct are already reflected in published appellate
opinions, many are not. There is no appellate review if defendants are
acquitted; convicted defendants may not raise prosecutors’ forensic
misconduct as a point on appeal if there is no likelihood that the appellate
court will find it to be prejudicial; and appellate courts do not publish
opinions in all cases where prosecutors acted improperly at trial. The trial
transcripts in the repositories will therefore add significantly to training
material now made available in published opinions.
Second, the rebuke banks would enable courts and disciplinary
authorities to punish serious and repeat offenders. Courts and
commentators recognize that prosecutors who repeatedly flout the rules
should be sanctioned.86 But courts have not necessarily taken the
initiative to learn whether a particular prosecutor’s misbehavior is an
isolated occurrence or one in a series of similar wrongs. If prosecutors’
occasional transgressions can be overlooked, their transgressions in trial
after trial should not be. At some point, a prosecutor who repeatedly
misbehaves, even if out of ignorance or indifference, should be
sanctioned.
Third, to the extent that rebukes are meant to have some deterrent
effect on the individual prosecutor beyond the particular trial in which a
judge issues it, preserving records of rebukes will amplify their impact.
That is because the slate is not wiped clean once the trial is over. The
prosecutor will be reminded that the record of misconduct is preserved.
The rebuke functions like a demerit—it is not itself a sanction, but added
together, a succession of rebukes may justify a sanction.
If individual rebukes have greater sting in themselves, and recurring
rebukes can lead to formal professional sanctions, the cost of misconduct
will no longer be externalized. Trial prosecutors engaging in cost-benefit
analyses will have a greater incentive to comply with the rules.87 Once
86. See, e.g., Bidish Sarma, Using Deterrence Theory to Promote Prosecutorial Accountability,
21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 573, 628 (2017) (“Given that repeat offenders represent—or at least
appear to represent—a significant problem in the realm of prosecutorial misconduct, disciplinary
bodies should prioritize apprehending and punishing those prosecutors who have violated the rules
on multiple occasions.”).
87. See Alexandra White Dunahoe, Revisiting the Cost-Benefit Calculus of the Misbehaving
Prosecutor: Deterrence Economics and Transitory Prosecutors, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 45
(2005).
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rebuked, the prosecutor will have a motivation to learn the applicable
standards of courtroom behavior, to practice employing them rather than
falling back on intuitive conduct, and ultimately to act more carefully in
future trials. New prosecutors seeking to avoid having their misconduct
memorialized may be motivated to take care even before receiving a first
judicial rebuke.
Fourth, keeping records of prosecutors’ low-level misconduct will
allow courts and disciplinary authorities to ascertain when an office, or
unit of an office, is responsible for a disproportionate amount of
misbehavior. Judicial or disciplinary authorities can then explore whether
repeated offenses reflect a failure on the part of particular managerial or
supervisory prosecutors to make reasonable efforts to ensure trial
prosecutors’ compliance with the relevant rules. If so, authorities can
impose discipline or adopt other regulatory measures.88 Further, the risk
of discipline may motivate managers and supervisors in the prosecutor’s
office to perform their supervisory responsibilities more diligently.
Fifth, through the various mechanisms identified above, increased
judicial attention to low-level misconduct may strengthen trial and
supervisory prosecutors’ commitment to compliance with the norms of
courtroom behavior, leading to enhancing the office’s internal culture and
controls.89 Ideally, a stronger culture of compliance will result in greater
compliance with all norms of prosecutorial conduct, thereby reducing
serious as well as minor misconduct.
All of this speaks to prosecutors’ compliance with the law, not to their
exercise of discretion. But, finally, there may even be an incidental
benefit in that area as well. Many on the defense side perceive that
prosecutors lack empathy for their clients.90 This may be in part because
prosecutors, regarding themselves as rule-abiding, lack sympathy or
understanding toward those who break society’s rules. Prosecutors who
are confronted with the reality that they and their colleagues are also
occasional rule breakers may develop a better understanding that people
are imperfect, that basically law-abiding people are susceptible to various
kinds of pressures to break the rules, and that those who break the law do
not invariably deserve punishment. Prosecutors who acknowledge that
they and their colleagues are imperfect and have benefitted from the
disciplinary process’s leniency may be influenced to extend greater
leniency to those who transgress minor criminal laws.
88. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.1(a)–(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
89. On the importance of internal controls in prosecutors’ offices, see generally Rachel E.
Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor’s Office, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2089 (2010).
90. See, e.g., Abbe Smith, Are Prosecutors Born or Made?, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 943,
955–57 (2012).
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The ultimate objective is to identify a measured, proportionate
response to prosecutors’ low-level, on-the-record misconduct that,
standing alone, does not merit public discipline or an equivalent stigma.
Entirely ignoring the disciplinary implications of prosecutors’
misconduct places too much weight on prosecutors’ interest in
proportionality at the expense of the public interests served by the
disciplinary process. Maintaining records of individual prosecutors’
problematic courtroom conduct strikes a better balance.
Of course, one can debate the details. For example, there is room for
disagreement regarding whether the repositories should be open to the
public, thereby augmenting the possibility of unfair stigma, or should be
available only to courts and disciplinary authorities, notwithstanding that
the transcripts are public records.91 There may also be disagreement
concerning whether, before a transcript is included, some prior
determination must be made that a judicial rebuke was deserved or that
the prosecutor’s conduct was otherwise improper. Particularly if
transcripts are publicly available, some predetermination may be justified
so that prosecutors are not stigmatized when innocent behavior is
included in the repository. On the other hand, if “probable cause” or the
like must be found before a transcript is included, the stigma is likely to
be even greater. Perhaps the ideal is a disclaimer that the repository is just
a virtual storage facility and that no prejudgments are made about
whether transcripts necessarily reflect misbehavior.
One might also consider whether, after a period of time, transcripts
should be removed or expunged, or whether, particularly given the
infrequency of trials, records of misconduct should be preserved
throughout lawyers’ careers in criminal prosecution. And prosecutors
would doubtless propose that if transcripts of their misconduct are
maintained in a rebuke bank, transcripts of defense lawyers’ misconduct
should be deposited there as well.
Resolving these questions to strike a fair balance is essential, because
judges who think it is unduly harsh to keep records of rebukes may refrain
from issuing rebukes to prosecutors who deserve them. This would be an
example of what others identify as “remedial deterrence,” that is, where

91. In Bartko v. United States DOJ, 898 F.3d 51 (D.C. Cir. 2018), the court of appeals
considered the conflicting public and privacy interests in the context of a Freedom of Information
Act request for documents of the Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility. In
this particular case, the court determined that the public interest in documents relating to
investigations of prosecutorial misconduct outweighed the individual prosecutor’s interest in
privacy.
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the costs of remedies deter courts from invoking them.92 While courts
might be reluctant to deposit transcripts in the rebuke banks and may even
be deterred from issuing rebukes, however, judges cannot avoid ruling on
objections to prosecutors’ misconduct. The interest in ruling correctly, to
avoid appellate reversals, should far outweigh whatever judicial
sympathies or interests might lead trial judges to minimize or overlook
prosecutors’ misbehavior. And, regardless of whether rebukes follow,
records of sustained objections to prosecutors’ questions and arguments
should themselves be preserved. Therefore, even if one acknowledges the
risk that rebuke banks will deter some judges, and not just prosecutors,
preserving searchable records of arguable prosecutorial misbehavior
would better serve the public interest than consigning the records to
oblivion.
CONCLUSION
Trial prosecutors’ visible misbehavior, such as improper questioning
of witnesses and improper jury arguments, may not seem momentous.
Sometimes, the improprieties are simply the product of poor training or
overenthusiasm. In many cases, they pass unremarked. As the Chicago
Eight trial illustrated, trial prosecutors’ improprieties may also be
overshadowed by the excesses of other trial participants—the witnesses,
the defendants, the defense lawyers, or even the trial judge. And when
noticed, prosecutors’ trial misbehavior can ordinarily be remedied, and
then restrained, by a capable trial judge. It is little wonder that
disciplinary authorities, having bigger fish to fry, are virtually indifferent
to the problem. And yet, in the obvious absence of disciplinary regulation,
prosecutors and their offices have less motivation to “play by the rules.”
The challenge for disciplinary regulation is to find a proportional
response to trial misconduct—one that does not punish prosecutors
undeservedly, unnecessarily, or too harshly but that nevertheless serves
regulatory ends. Building on the Supreme Court’s observation in Berger
that the prosecutor’s repeated improprieties should have been met with
“stern rebukes,” this Article proposes that prosecutorial improprieties that
are deserving of judicial rebuke should not be forgotten. Rather,
repositories—or rebuke banks—should be maintained to preserve
transcripts of prosecutors’ on-the-record misconduct, even when it is
committed unintentionally. Maintaining these records, which would be
relatively easy in the computer age, would serve salutary regulatory ends
92. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
857, 884–85 (1999); Sonja B. Starr, Rethinking “Effective Remedies”: Remedial Deterrence in
International Courts, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 695–96 (2008).
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while maintaining the necessary sense of proportionality.
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